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I N T R 0 D U C T I O N.
In this examination of the law of imputed negli-
gence, the writer has confined himself to the rlation of
"parent and child" and appeals only to th3 laws underlying
such relations and the state of th law on this one subject.
Imputed negligence, especially from the parent to the infant
child, is a branch of th law of contributory negligence which
sprung up, as it Were, with a startling suadenness and from
which there seems to have been no settled recovery in the
minds of the courts and the la-v writers. Proclaimedas it
vas. by mere dictum, ana bound together only by fictions of
tht law, it easily hecame an object of assaultand a most
fruitful source of discussion. WUhile applied and followed by
some high jul'isdictions, it is discouraged by other jurisdic-
tions of equal prominence. But the effect of the diversity
seems to be to lean towards a ccrtain goal and this will be
one of the important elements to make uo this paper. Looking
first at the persons with whom the subject deals, we will then
attempt to apply those principles of law which have given us
cause to present this subject.
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C H A P T E R I.
I. Status of a Child !1on Sui Juis.
(A) Opinions of Text 'Vriters.:- Who are non sui juris has
been answered at length by all of the leading text writers on
the subject of contributory negligence. A person of suffic-
ient age and capacity is bound to use reasonable car- to pre-
vent injuries to others from his own acts o- injuries to him-
self from the acts of others. What amounts to such reasonable
care, depends upon the circumstances in each particular case.
Lord Ellenborough, in Butterfield v. Forrest:r (II East 60)
puts it, "a person is not to throwv himself upon an o!)struc-
tion and get damages or make it the fault of another; and if
he doesn't us- common and ordinary caution to be in the right,
he can only have himself to blame. One person being in fault
doesn't dispense with anothers using ordinary care with him-
self." But a person non sui juris is not supposed to have
!I
the capacity of such a reasonable man and hence an exception
is made as to him, and he is not required to show the judgment
and discretion of more developed beings. "Idiots and lunatics
are of this class. Infants may be said, in general, to be-
long to this class also, but very evidently not all infants.
it is a question of capacity and has been found a difficult
question in many courts, besides a very fruitful source of con-
-3-
troversy as to what age is sufficient to constitute an infant
sui juris. This is usually a question for th jury, but in
certain cases where there can be no doubt, the court decides
as a matter of law to avoid danger. (a) The !7ev York Court
of Appeals says, "an infant in its first years is not sui jur-
is. It belongs to another to Thom discretion in the care of
its person is exclusively confided. The custody of the in-
fant of tender years is confided by the law in its parents, or
to those standing in loco parentis, and not having that discre-
tion necessary for personal protection, the parent is held in
law to ex-rcise it for him. " (b) This statement is denied
by Mr. Beach, and he says, "it is not true that an infant is
not sui juris. In the sense of maintaining an action in his
own name, he is sui juris. As far as his right of action is
concerned, he is in no respect the chattel of his father. At
common law he was required to sue by a guardian appointed by
the court. go they are at all times subject to the court.
The judgment if recovered is the sole property of the minor
and it is recovered fo- his sole use." (c). Following this
denial, the learned writer takes exception to the furthr con-
(a) Beach on Con. Neg., Par. 117.
(b) Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend, 615.
tc) Beach on Con. Neg, Par. 128.
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tention that the parent is the a6 ent of the child. He says:
"Agency is founded on contract either express or implied, by
which one of the parties confides to the other the management
of some business to be transacted in his nameon his account,
and by which the other assumes to do the business and render
an account of it." (a) "Nor is the relation analogous to a-
gency. He does not appoint him, he has no action against
him; every element of agency is wanting." By common law the
child couldn't appoint an agent, so the power of the parent is
derived from the law. The term "non sui juris" is almost
universally applied by the courts in speaking of very young
children who are incapable of using discretion, and we will
apply it in the same form here.. The law stands in a posi-
tion of parent to all minor children which may place a restric-
tion on the acts of the real parents. The health and welfare
of children may be protected and warrented by legal acts when
it is apparent that they are being subjected to injurious acts
a
on the part of their parents or guardians. The law says par-
ent shall perform certain unspecified duties towards his child,
and such duties are not merely voluntary on the part of the
parent, but, on the contrary, have a compulsory process of the
law behind them. In return the child is duty bound to accept
(a) 7each on Con. Neg., Par. 129.
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the care and services of the parent and submit to his control.
But it is a relation distinct from any other relation between
parties known to the law. There is no such unity in them
that the act of on- must necessarily cause co-operation in the
other. Nor is there any contract relation between them; it is
simply a good parent and obedient son, bound together by those
mysterious e-F ties, parental love and affection. "In ea 'ly in-
fancy and onward to a period not made definite by adjudica-
tions, but depending upon the particular case, with its cir-
cumstances and the intelligence of the individual child, the
child is , in law, incapable of contributory negligence. (a)
Holding to our rule that a perso,- must use reasonable care as
to himself and in what he does, it becomes neceIssary to ascer-
tain when a child of tender years is to be held to the same
rules as adult persons or what is to he required of them be-
fore they reach that age. We ,ill, then, consider as clearly
as possible what the holdings of the various courts justify
as a conclusion of car- in a child non sui juris and those in
parental relations to him.
(a) Tishop on Non-contract Lav, Par. 566.
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II. WHAT IS REASONABLE CARE ?
(A) In an Infant Non Sui Juris:- The question has been
much discussed whether a child non sui juris could b; held to
use reasonable care, or rather whether such a child can be
negligent at all so as to materially affect his cause of ac-
tion for injuries caused by the negligence of another. Surely
none of us could imagine a new horn babe being held responsi-
ble for any degree of care with a duty imposed upon it to use
such care under circumstances. There must be a tim when no
care is required. When does he reach the age ven he is re-
quired to use care ? There is no certain time when we can
say that children of such an age must use so much care and
other children a-different degree of care. 1hat then 1would
be reasonable care in one, would not amount to reasonable care
in another. Some children of a certain age know more and h~ve
c greater mental capacity than other children of that age.
On the other hand, the care due an infant becomes greater as
his years are less. The care due this class of persons is
greater than the la,-v exacts in dealing with any other class of
persons. (a) "As to neglect or dereliction of the parent or
guardian being a reason why - child should be misused with im-
punity by third persons, it has been held that such wrong do-
ing causing injury is an offence of an aggravated nature.
(a) Reach on Con. Neg., Par. 124.
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The most reasonable rule st,-Ms to be that a child is bound on-
ly to use such care as may reasonably b'3 exp ;cted fror, one of
his a-e and capacity under similar circumstances. Th erefore,
we conclude that the younger the child, the less degree of
care is required of him, and at some age there is a vanishing
point where no care is required. That age we cannot deter-
mine. The courts have almost unanimously decided that the
above rule is the test, and each case depends upon th. circum-
stances surrounding it. A most important cms is that of
Lynch v. Wardin (a) where defendant's servant left a wagon on
the street with no one to guard it and the plaintiffwhile
playing around the wagon, -v s injured. The court there held
that the child used only such care as one of his tender years
and discretion could be expected to use and that the defen-
dant's agentby leaving the cart alone held out a temptation
to such childrenwhich he could not be heard to deny, nor ex-
cuse himself from injuries to those who haQ fallen into his
trap. This has been followed by the United States courts
and most state courts. Briefly stated, "th,: minor,of vThat-
ever ageis required to > xercise the care, vhich, under the
circumstances, is reasonably to b-e expected of one of his par-
ticular years and capacity, a lack ,Ahereof is, if contributory
( a ) 1 Q . DB . i -/
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to the injury he complains of, the barring contributory negli-
gence. " (a) In analogy to the- rule that under seven years
children cannot commit U crime, some courts have held them also
incapable of negligence, but that is not to !e conclusively
presumed. It has never found favo-- among many courts and is
not given any veight. The failure of the child to use great-
er capacity is no fault of the child nor the parent, and in
no case, I think, will the bare act of a child of tender years
and capacity be considered negligence per se, but a question
for the jury.
(7) A Question for the Jury. "Unless a child is exceed-
ingly young, it is usually left to the jury to determine the
measure of care required of' th particular child in th!; ac-
tual circumstances of the case. (b) There would be no need
of sending the question to the jury as to the negligence of 'a
very small child, because not a matter of doubt or on which
reasonable men would differ. Those cases where the parent
has permitted a small child to place itself in a position of
danger and it is injured through the fault of another, as a
(a) Bishop on Non-contract Law, Sec. 586.
(b) Beach, Par. 117.
rule, present complicated or uncertain facts, or evidence re-
quired to be .eighed, or perhaps other reasons, which renders
it necessary to be sent to the jury. (a) After an ag, -and un-
der circumstances not definable by rule, the court can see that
t1te infant is capable of contributory negligence and it vill
not suffer the jury to ignore the fact. In a New York case,
(b) where a boy nine years old w.as knocked do-Ri by defendant's
street car, the defendants contended that the plaintiff's age
was inaterial and no excuse for negligence, and must show a
compliaoce on which his right of action rusts. But the court
held "that it was a question for the jury and depended upon
the circumstances of the case. The result of an act does not
n. cessarily condemn the act as rash or even negligent. It
may have been an error of judgment and in such a case it is a
question for the jury to decide whether a person of ordinary
prudence and discretion might not, under the circumstances,
have formed and acted upon the same judgment. " "In each case,
the measure and degree of care, the omission of rhich would
constitute negligence , is to be graduated by the age and ca-
pacity of the individual". (c) The most sensible rule seems
to be not only to put the question of the child's reasonable
(a) Bishop on Non-contract Law, Sec. 580.
(b) Thurber v. Harlem Bridge, Morr isaina v. Forqcham R. h. Co.,
60 N. Y. , 326. (c) Barry v. N. Y. Cent., 99 N. Y., 289.
Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt., 213.
-92-
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care to the jivy, but also -ihat is rmasonahle care in U par-
ent or person in charge of an infant.
(C) The Reasonable Care of a Parent is a Question for
the Jury. This is the inevitable re sult to be drawn from
the cases, that the negligence of the parent thich contributes
to th injury of the child is not, per se, but rather a Clues-
tion for the jury, (a) ana even though the parents were negli-
gent, their negligence ',ic'ald br remote if the chila did no act
which would he negligence in an adult. (b) It is not:negli-
gence per se to send a child of tenoer years out on the street
on an errand. This is a question for the jury, being a mat-
ter of judgment. "ut where the parent is in the immediate di,
rection an,; control of the child, his negligence may amount to
such as to he unnecessary to go to the jury. If the child
exercised proper care and the defendant or his agent vas negli-
gent and caused th, injury, the defendant is liable without
regard to the question whethr'- it was negligent in the parents
to let the child go out as they did. The negligence of the
parent then, if it exist,-d, would be too remote. But again
if the parents or attendant were not negligent and the defen-
dant was, mere -vant of care or personal negligence on the
(a) Kuntz v. The City of Troy, 104 !. Y., 344.
(h) Lynch v. Smith, 104 IMass, 53.
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part of the child would not, under the circumstances of the
case, absolve the def>endant from liahility. (a) 3ut .ven
unuer these circ-amstances it must not be lost sight of that
ianton or willful negligence alte-s the case materially.
Should the parent exhibit such wanton or willful misconduct as
to denote an intent to harm the child, it may absolve the de-
fendant and throlv the consequences on the partent.
Having, perhaps, only lightly observed the position
of the infant in law and the requirements as to his safety by
himself and his parents, we may come to the principal subject
with which we have to deal, and observe their duties and rela-
tions in a more definite form.
(a) Ihl v. The 42n& Street I Grand St. R. R. Co., 47 N. Y
317. Payne v. Th _ Tiumeston & Shenanckoah Ry. Co., 70 Ia. 548.
-1 o -
III. THE DOCT1 INE WlF[I THE NEGTiIGENCE 0,2 THE PidWiNT IS IMPUTED.
(A) Hartfield v. Roper. This doctrine was created
when the famous case of Hartfitld V. Roper (a) was decided,
(183) , and is perhaps hetter kno.rn by the name of that case
than by any other name. The circumstances of the case, brief-
ly, a.,e, "that a young child wnt out in the road and was sit-
ting in a snow pathand defendant vas d'iving along in a cut-
ter at a moderate gait. He did not see the child and ran
over it, injuring it, for which injuries the child seeks to
recover on the grounds of the defendant's negligence. " The
court held, "that the plaintiff was wrongfully in the road and
the negligence of those in charge of him amounted to criminal
neglect. It was their duty to take charge of a child of such
tender years and their negligence must be imputed to the child,
because a person in the charge of others, who himself is help-
less, cannot take advantage of and imposea penalty on defen-
dant because of the neglect of the one looking after him. He
must stand it himself, if' anybody, and although it may be
harsh, small children are not freed from the leal effects of
the law." This boctrinc, although unsupported 1y any other
decision upon which it was based, has been followed in several
(a) 21 Wendell, 615.
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other states to an uncertain extent, among vhich, without an
attempt to enumerate, are DTassachusetts, Maine, California,
Maryland, and Kansas.
The harshness of the rule, howvever, has callud for
many modifications, and it is nov,, st'ictly confined .nct not in
any way extended. (a) The rule must only be appliedL where
the child itself has failed to use that degree of care which
would be required of an adult. If it has been free from ne-
gligence, as an adult, then no amount of negligence on the
part of the parent, or guardian, can effect the -ight to re-
cover, except, of course, as their acts, in breaking the se-
quence of .:vents, might effect any other p ,rson. The whole
theory of imputed negligence rests upon the assumption that the
child has acted in a manner which would be negligence if it
has been of age. (b) The New York rule now is a modification
of this old rule, and, in fact, the courts rather exhibit a de-
sire to avoid it. (c) It is no longer per se negligent to
let children o#erhaps six or seven years go on the street a-
lone. Th- negligence of the parent o- guardian, is imputted
only wihen the guardian, by an act or omission, in the capacity
(a) peach, Par. 122.
(b) Sherman and Redfield, Sec. 79.
(c) 1Mangan v. Th, Brooklyn City R. R. Co. , 36 Barb., 230.
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of tht guardian. "The fact that the chil, has ben found in
an injured condition is not proof of neggligence in the guar-
dian. It is me-rely prima facib evidence of 1,vnt of care. So
we may say, in most all of these casu-s, "the personal conduct
of the infant does not constitute the bar. " It may have an
important bea-'ing on the question of defendant's neglig nce,
but when the defendant is clearly negligent, the contributory
pe-wnal negligence of the infant, obviously non su± juris,
cannot be alleged, unless the negligence of the parent has
brought about the situation and in some way contributed to the
injury:' (a) In McGove-n v. Th: N. Y. C 1: H. R. R. R., (b),
the New York courts went farther and said, "that a child need
only use such care as a child of his age and capacity would be
likely to use under those circumstances, and was a question
for the jury. " The case has been followed by the later case
of Kuntz v. The City of Troy (c), and Huerzeller v. Th2 Central
Cross To-n R. R. Co. (d). A distinction was also made be-
+i
t.een the proximate and remote act of the parent, and it was
held that where a parent permitted a chilo to go out vith a
young man of suitable age to care for it, and the yoang man
(a) Ihl v. R. R. Co. , 47 N. Y., 317. ]'cGarry v. Loomis, et al.
63 N. Y., 104.
(h) McGovern v. N. Y. C. c, E. R. R. R. , 67 jT. Y., 417.
(c) .104 N. Y., 344.
(d) 139 N. Y., 490.
was negli -ent, that th- act of the parent ras too remote, but
that th, negligence of the young man -,uld b-, imputed to the
child directly and not to th, parent. (a)
Massachusetts has followed Ne i York closely in the
application of the doctrine, but there too, the strict rule
has been relaxed. What appears to be a most revolting appli-
cation of this rule was in a case :here a young girl was made
ill by the escape of gas from the defendant's pipes. (b) She
was in her own house and did nothing herself to bring about
the result. The ga enetrated and perva:ed the house where
she -vas. The loophole of escape from liability afforded the
defendants was "that the father did not use proper precautions
to inform the defendants of the escaping of the gas when he
first discovere4t. " Therefore, his omission was such negli-
gence as vould b' imputed to her and prevent her recovery of
damages. The groumds %for this decision were that she was un-
der the care of he, father, who has the custody of her person
and vas responsible for her safety. It was his duty to watch
over her, guard her from danger and provide for her wellfare,
and it was hers to submit to his government and control. eirg
(a) Metcalf v. Rochester Ry. Co., 42 N. Y. Supp., 620.
(b) Holly v. The Boston Gas Light Co., 6 Gray, 123.
I A n, 431,
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entitled to the benefits of his superintendence, sh must also
be subject to any disadvantages resulting from the- exercise
of that parental authority which it is his right anu duty to
exert. Apyone of ordinary care, therefore, on his part, ±s
attributable to her in the same degree as if she were wholly
acting for herself. t How the honorabl court could conceive
of the proximity of the parent's negligence to such an injury
is not easily explained. Surely if the plaintiff had been an
adult, there would have been no connection betvhehn the action
of the parent and t he plaintiff. The effect here is that the
defendant makes the home of the plaintiff a dangerous placjand,
because she doesn't receive the protection which that home
should afford her, she is to be injured with impunity. The
case is by no means authority for the prevailing doctrine in
Massachusetts,but merely tends to show the application some-
times made ofi the rule of Hartfield v. Roper. What is in
fact a modification of this harsh rule is showi in the case
of liunn v. Reed (a) which held that it -ias not rc-egligence
per se for a mother to permit a small child to play with a
strange dog, and that it was a question for the jury to decide
from the circumstances what woild be reasonable care in the
plaintiff, taking into consideration his age and capacity.
(a) 4 Allen, 431.
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The parent's negligence was also a quustion for the jury, but
if it was found to contribute would he imputed to the child.
The present rule seems to drift away from the repul-
sive elements of the old one ancd, besides holding the parent's
negligence a question for the jury, (a) it requires a child to
use only such care as may r-asonably be expecte~d fror. one of
his age and capacity under the same circumstances. And even
if the parents were negligent, such negligence would be remote
if the child has done no act which .vould be negligent in an
adult. (b) So while we see this rule followed in a way, it
is with a tenaency to draw away and escape its application.
A strong example of its a anoa in Massachusetts, is shown by com-
parison o. the holdings in Lynch v. Smith (c) and Plumley v.
Birge. (d)
Soma 3tates hav- gone so far as to change their hold-
ings to an entirely opposite view, and have repudiated alto-
gether the doctrine of Hartfield v. Roper. (e4
(a) Mulligan v. Curtis, 100 Mass. , 512.
(b) Lynch v. Smith, 104 Mass, 53.
(c) 104 Mass., 53.
(d) 124 Mass., 57.
(e) Illinois and Iowa.
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IV. TiIE DOCTRINE AGAINST IMPUTING SUCH NEGLIGEHCE.
(A) Generally. oVermont has always repudiated the doc-
trine imputing negligence to a child and says the child is
only hound to use the care and prudence equal to his capacity.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania shows no toleration for the
doctrine and Nr Pampshire gives it a contemptuous kick and
says, "a man's property .-ould be protected; so a child should
be under no less protection of the law than his chattel."(a)
The Vermont rule is stated clearly in Robinson v.
Cone,(b) which ease holds, that although a child is negligently
permitted by its parents to go into the highway andwhile im-
properly there, is injured through the negligence of the defen-
dant, he is not precluded fl'om his redress. "Ifi the defendant
knows that such a person is in the road, he is bound to a pro-
portionate degree of watchfulness - to the extent of circum-
spection - or, what .muld be reasonable care to a person whom
he supposed of full capacity would be gross negligence as to
a child or on? incapable of escaping danger'.  Both plaintiff
and defendant must use reasonable care and the negligence of
the defendant makes him liableiwhile the negligence of the
plaintiff bars his recovery; but the care of the plaintiff
(a) Beach on Cont. Neg., Par. 132.
(b) 22 Vt., 213.
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must be measured by his age and capacity. Judge Redfield
compares the escaped animal to the child, as foilo,:-s: "If the
animal had been injured whefthe d, fendant, i-y the usef or-
dinary care, could have avoided it, he is liable; and that even
though the animal was improperly there. A person is bound not
to use his own to do harm and if a person kno vs that such othE
person is in the highway or on a railroad , he is bound to a
proportionate degree of care. Ordinary care means that de-
gree of care which may reasonably be expected of a person in
plaintiff's condition and this would evidently be very small
indeed in so young a child." The (whole case~seems to base
its decision on the age and capacity of the plaintiff, and
there is no reason to doubt the soundness of the decision.
In criticising the case of Hartfield v. Roper, the
court said: "The case is old and a variance with Lynch v. Nur-
din (a) and far less sound in its principles and infininitely
less satisfacory to the instinctive sense of reason and jus-
tice. "
The case of Lynch v. Nurdin is cited most favorably
by the cases holding this side of the question and is consider-
ed as tht English authority. In that case the defendant's
agent negligently left a horse and cart on a street with1 no
one in charge of it while he went into a place nearby. The
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plaintiff and some other children began playing around the
cart, and :Thile plaintiff was climbing upon the wheel, one of
his friends started the horse whereby the plaintiff was thrown
to the ground and injured by the cart passing over him. It was
held: "That the plaintiff being a child could only be expected
to use the care that his age and capacity 1vould warrant." And
further, "that even though the plaintiff was a trespasser,
yet the defendant was deemed to have anticipated such trespass.
It was a temptation held out to young children to come and
play there which the defendant cannot be heard to deny." Te
The court considered it gross negligence and not much distin-
guished from willful negligence. ' The law runs the two into
each other considering such a degree of negligence some proof
of malice: This case is familarly cited in connection with
those cases where the infant plaintiff is a trespasser on a
railroaand in the railroad turn-table cases.
The United Staes federal courts have settled to the
rule that a child's care must be in proportion to his age and
capacity. (a) But it has been held that no negligence could
be imputed to a boy six yearsG1id, so the question of contrib-
utory negigence did not enter the cause. (b) Per-_haps the
(,a) McGuire v. Chicago, M.. 1' St. P. FEy. Co., 37 Fed. Rep., 54.
(b) C,,nt Trust Co. of N. Y. v. The Wabash, St. L. * P. Ry. Co.
31 Fed. Rep., 246.
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rule is most truly stated in Berry v. The Lake Erie & W. R.
R.. (a) Here the child was returning from school and while
crossing defendant's track ,.vas struck by an engine making a
flying switch. The court said: "Many courts hold if the par-
ent sues for the injury of a child, and the parent has been
negligent, he cannot recover. Also if a parent is in charge
and present at the time of the injury the parent's negligence
may be imputed to the child. But I cannot see why a parent's
negligence shoul-d be imputed when the parent is not present
and the negligence of the defendant is the cause of the injury.
Property negligently placed on ones o'.,m premises so that sparks
may come and burn it up the owner may nevertheless recover.
So if a parent negligently lets a child g ft hurt the child may
recover, notwithstanding the negligence of the parent. Sure-
ought
ly the law to regard human life and limb as well as his prop-
eYrty. It is said that the child is under the care of the
parents but the child has no ch6ice in the matter. The
child ought not to suffer irreparable inju-y without redress,
bec'ause the parent, from the want of care, has failed to pro-
tect it from harm. 'It seems a harsh, if not a cruel, rule to
make it answerable in its maimd limbs or ruin-d health for
the negligence of its parent. The parent's care ought to be
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a shield to protect the child, but the want of it ought not to
be used as a sword to injure or impair the right of theinfant
to recover for injux-ries received through the negligence of
another. The act of the parent is passive and that of the
wrong doer active and the injury would not have happened but
for the active wrong of the wong doer. A wife with her hus-
band does not become negligent because her husband is and yet
she may r'ecover and a child cannot merely because he has no
choice in who shall guard him. The modern text writers re-
pudiate the doctrine of imputed negligence in cases of infants
of such tender years and immature judgment as to be incapable
of exercising care for their on safety."
The courts of Pennsylvania also repudiate the doc-
trinJ of imputed negligence and if the infant has not the abil-
ity to foresee and avoid danger, negligence will not be imput-
ed to him. (a) Thi courts hold that the railroad company
owes no duty to the trespasser and so not liable for injuries
received by a trespasserjthe right of the company being exclu-
sive. This bars both the action of a child, and of a parent,
because the parent owed a duty and the company did not (b);and
this holding is affirmed in a later case (c) ..hich holds that
(a) Rauch v. Lloyd and Hill, I Pa. St. 3i58. Smith v. Q Con-
nor, 48 Pa. St., 216. Phila. 7alt. - W.' R.R. Co., v. Layer,
2 Amerman, 414. (b) Cauley v. P. C. - St. i R.-. Co. , 14
Noris, 308. (c) 3. '0. Ry. v. Schwingling, 5 Outerbridge, 258
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as to trespassers the railroad comp:,ny~olly for ,vanton or in-
tentional injury. The question is simply .Yvther there was
a duty to the plaintiff which wqs violated by the defendant.
If not then there is no legal liability. The age or capacity
of the respasser is evidently immaterial snd there being no
negligence there is no liability.
It is held to be settled law;- that when the parent
brings the action for the loss of services or expenses incur-
red because of the itijury to the child, any negligence on his
parttcontributing to the injury will bar his action. His
auty.toward the child becomes greater the more helpless and in-
discreet the child is. "If, by his owYn carelessness, he cton-
tributes to his own loss of the child's services he may be said
to be in pari delicto with the negligent defendant. (a) The
negligence of the parent however is a question for the jury.
Any number of cases hold that the negligence of the
parent will not be imputed to bar an action by the child and
it is not doubted as a rule in this state. (b)
Although the courts in Illinois have seemingly here-
tofore imputed the negligence of the parent to a limited de-
gree it may now be considered as settled that the negligence
of the parent is not to be imputed to the child. The court in
(a) Glassey v. Tiestonville, 1,antua , Fairmount Ry. Co.,
Smith, 172.
(b) E'ie City Pas,. RyA Co. v. Schuster, 3 Arperman, 412.
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the case of The Chicage City Ry. Co. V. Wilcox (a) speLaks
of this and says, ,t t. seems to he assumed by several of the
writers on the subject that this court is comitted to the doc-
trine that in a suit by a child to recover damages, caused by
the negligence of the plaintiff's parents and custodians may be
imputed to the plaintiff in support of the defence of contrib-
utory negligeJnce. While there is, in some of the cases, some
foundation for this assumption, yet in our opinion the questiol
has never been so considered or d-,atermined by this court as
to make it the settled rule of this state.1" Thie rule is then
given: "That the negligence of the parednt or others standing
in loco parentis cannot be imputed to him so as to support a
defence of contributory negligence in a suit for damages."
The cases are divided into two classes by the learn-
ed judge, being first, where it is decided as a matter of law
up to a certain age, the precise limit of -ihich is not and can-
not be well defined, a child is incapable of such conduct as
will constitute contributory negligence. The other class is
"that young children are bound to use only such care as may
reasonably be expected of children of the same age and degree
of intelligence and it is always, therefore, a question of fact
for the jury to decide from all the circumstances of the par-
(a) 138 Ill., 7Q. City of Pekin v. Mc?1Jahon, 1F4 Ill., 141.
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ticular case' "Doubtless a child may possess, to a corsider-
able extent, what may be termed instinct of self preserva-
tion and.n consequence b capable of using considerable care
for his o-n safety; but when moved by that instinct, he acts
only in view of what he sees or what is actually present to
his s,-,nses. To guard against unforeseen danger, or that whida
has not come waithin the sphere of his observation, and requir-
es an exercise of reason and reflection, of vhich so young a
child is seldom capable, and for which the law, a:iministered
on humane principles, will scarcely hold him responsible."
Th-e above opinion is one of the most admirable and
sound discussions in su1 port of this doctrine that I have fourr.
in any of the numerous cases oi- text books and is a good state-
PI l
ment of the doctrine in question.
New Jersey forcibly scores the doctrine imputing ne-
gligence to the child and follows Pennsylvania and other stat
repudiating Hartfield v. Roper.
The most sweeping changes in the holdings of the
courts have been made by the courts in Iowa. The ea:'ly cases
held that the parents negligence was imputed to the child,
but in Wmore v. Mahaska County (a) where the administrator
of a child two years old sues, the old doctrine was entirely
(a) 78 Iowa, 396.
-26-
broken dovm. The court said: "Although the- parent's neglig-
ence may bar an action by themselves, it cannot bar an action
by the child. The child cannot be negligent and it cannot
authorize another to be such; therefore, it is unreasonable
to make him liable for the negligence of thepa-,'ent. " And it
was further held that there was no ground for distinction be-
tween cases Where the parent has the child under his immediate
control and wher,: theL parent.is absent. As the administrator
was seeking to recover' for the child and not the parent he was
entitled to recover.
(B) As Criticising Ilartfield v. Roper. The criticisms
of Hartfield v. Roper are many and uniformly severe. Mr.
Beach , in his book on Contributory Negligence (a), argues
very strongly against any soundness in the principle. He de-
nies in the first place, "that the infant is not sui juris for
the purpose of maintaining an action of his own. Nor is therex
relation of ptincipal and agent or any analogous relation: ev-
ey element of agency is wanting. By common law the child
could not appoint ;-n agent so the parOnt gets his authority
from the law: 'The parent's authority is given for the pro-
tection of the child, but the rule of Hartfield v. Roper turns
the shield into the sword and uses it to deprive the child of
(a) Beach on Con. Neg, Sec. 128-12.
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the very protection arising. from the parental relation." "The
doctrine being bsed upon authority, must be judged by the
reasoning by which it can .e supported. That reasoning is
founded upon the false assumption that there are varying de-
grees of negligence and corresponding degrees of liability;
that the judgment belongs not to th., child, but to the parent;
that there is no duty upon the court to protect the child; tha
the parent is the child's agent, and that the child has an ad-
equate remedy against his parent, and that such negligence is
contributory negligencil
And the courts in Pennsylvania (a) say,"it is repul-
sive to our natural instincts and repugnant to the condition
of that class of persons who have to maintain life by daily
toil, introducing incidentally to poor parent doctrine.
It is most forcibly criticized in N .7 Jersey in the
case of Newman v. The Philiipsburgh Horse Car R. R. Co., (2
where the court says: "I can't see ho.v in llartfield v. Roper
the custody of the infant leads to or justifies the imputation
of another fault in him. The law, natural and civil, put the
child in the care of adult, but how ran this right to care for
(a) Kays v. The Pa. R. R. Co., 6 F Pa. St., 269.
Phi la c Reading R. R. Co. v. Lo.g, 7! Pa. St., 257.
(h) 52 N. J. ,. , 146.
Bi shop on Non-contract Tia'v, S:c., 5 2.
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uim be construed into a right to ',aive or" forfeit any of the
legal rights of the infant ? The capacity to make such waiv-
er or forfeiture is not a necessary or even convenient inci-
dent to this affice of the adult, but on th_ contrary is quite
inconsistent -ith it, for the power to protect is the opposite
to the power' to harm hy act or omission. Tht rule in'Wendell-
the
must be dn the theory of the custodian of the infant being a-
gent of the infant; but it is mere assumption vithout legal
basis, for such custodian is the agent, not of the infant, ;'ut
of the law. A mother could not contract away the liability
of a railroad company for injuries to her babe causea by the
rail-vad's negligence - first, because the contract is contra
bonus mores, and second, because the mpother is not th: agent
of the child authorized to znter into the agreement. The im -
putability of negligence is a mert- pure interpolation of law,
rnot
and, until 21 Wendell, wasiknown of in the law. The law of
agency is supposed to be a voluntary act of th-1 principle, and
not have his agents forced upon him. The conversion of an in-
fant, who is entirely free from fault, into a wrong doer, by
imputation, is ,oily a logical ccntrivance incongenial *ith
the spirit of jurisprudence. The sensible 6-octrine is that a
child of tender years can't be negligent, nor h-ve it imputed
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to him; for he is incapable of a-,pointing an Cent, thr: conse-
quence being that he can in no way be considerecd to be the
!hl':r,able cause, either in the whole or in part , of his oxn
injury. It would make an infant in the nurse's arms liable
for the negligence o C the nuirse. If persons are injured by
the negligence of the nurse, they have an action against the
infant and he would be liable for neglects of his parents. But
no such doctrine has ever prevailed.
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V. SPECIAL DOCTRINES INTRODUCED.
Having discussed in a general way, th, holdings of
the courts en both sides of tlhe question of imputing negli-
genc; of the parents it is probably -a.ll to observe the spec-
ial doct'ines intro *uctu which may have materially influenced
the decisions in these cases.
(A) Effect of Presence of the Parent at th Injury. This
is a turning point upon which the cayuse of an injured child
may rest. The effect is that if the partnt is present at the
injury or has the child under his immediate control or direc-
tion, the parent's negligence' will be imputed to the child and
if the parent is not present, no negligence will be imputed.
The parent has a certain duty to perform towards the child and
the child is duty bound to submit to the pa~ient "s- government
and control. The child would be entitled to any advantages a-
rising from the -'elations, and so is subject to any disadvan-
tages resultinr. from the exercise of that parental authority.
If not present, then the child is only to use the care to be
expected from one of his age and capacity. (a) If the parent
(a) Stillson and Hannibal v. St. Joseph R. R. Co. , 67 Mo. , 671.
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is not present, and has not been negligent as to pe-initting
the child to go out Ulon, if child is injurc;d, the acts of the
parent .ould not b; the proximate cause and iii be no defence
to an action. An example of such a case voula be where the
parent has put the child in cha--'w of a person reasonably com-
petent to care for him, and injury results from some negligence
of the custodian. Here the parent's act was not proximately
connected. The presence of the parent is merely a limited ap-
plication of the rule in Ha-tfield v. Roper, and should not be
applied even unde' such an exceptional circumstance. I can
see no distinction between the cases where the parent is pre-
sent and has the child under his immediate control and where
he is absent. The authority of the parent does not depend
upon the proximity of the child. (a) If the negligence were
to be imputed, the relation of iparent and child would exist
as much 7hen separated as when th y are together.
(B) Comparative Degrees of Negligence. This rule was
applied in negligence cases in Illinois and some other juris-
dictions, but never has attained popular favor. 7y it, one
(a) '.ymore v. Mahacka County, 76 Io'va, 3§a.
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who is guilty of any slight negligence may rec(ver, nevurthe-
less, df a person who has been grossly negligent, even thougih-
the negligence of both concur in point of time and place with
that of the other. (a) This is followea in Georgia and forms
a Tnart of th.,c Code of that state. .But the courts now gener-
ally say that it would be useless to state the doctrine of com-
parative ne,-ligence a. applicable to a plaintiff incapable of
exzrcising ordinary care for personal security- (b) T'.e com-
parative degrees, extraordinary, ordinary, and slight can'not
be fitly applied to children in reference to measures to be
observed by them for their own security. (c)
(C) Poor Parent Doctrine. By this doctrine the position
in life held by the parents is made a circumstance for the jury
to consider in connection with the other circumstances in
we-ighing the care use,; by the parent. Hr. Beach, in his work
on Contributory Negligence (d) commends the :'octrine and says:
"Most people in large cities are poor and unable to employ as-
sistance in taking care of their children. Often both par-
ents have to work f-om home to procure food. Children crowd-
(a) Toledo \Vab. - .Ast. '.. R. Co. v. Grable, 8 Ill., 441.
(#) Georgia Code, Sec. 2072.
(b Chicago St. I.' c Pittsburgh R. R. Co. v. Welshl, 116 Ili.!-7
(c) Western & A. R. R. Co. v. Young, 7 S. E. Rep. (Ga.), c12.
(d) Beach on Con. Teg., Sec. 135.
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ed in ill aired t:cnements must hayw. air, and there is no re-
sort I-ut the streets. If one is injured in its helplessness,
it Joes not follow that it or its parents were negligent.
When it is all an accident, it is to be pitied; but when it
is injured through the negligence of ..nother, then it should
be permitted to bring an action the same as anyone else and
its poverty taken into consideration. The poverty and desti-
tution of the parent is not a license for the child to act
Vecklessly, yet it should not be a license for others to act
negligently towards it, but rather, should be a circumstance
to be considered." Poor parents can't keep their eyes~n
their children all of the time.
The question seems to be whether the parent used the
care for the child's safety as ordinary prudent persons in his
situatioH deem proper an. sufficient under like circumstances$%)
Illinois has adopted with favor this doctrine and
says the same rule should not be appliea to persons depending
upon their labor for support and to those vhose means enable
the mother of the family to give a constant personal attention
to the care of the children, or employ a nurse for that pux-
(a) Frick v. Th St. T., Kas., ?. Northern Ry. Co., 75 Mo., 542.
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pose. (a) This is similarly adopted in Pennsylvania (b), and
other states. Its increasing popularity is vinced by the
manner in whic> it is being taken up and I think rightly, be-
cause the law as a rule of civil conduct, should apply to all
positions to effect all its subjects.
(D) Parent's Negligenc the Proximate Cause. It is held
necessary in some jurisdictions, that in oraeo to be a defence
the par ;nt's negligence must. be proximate, and it -ill then
be imputed to the c hild. It is a fundamental rule of thj
law of cont-ibutory negligence that a person is I iable for
only such damages as his negligent acts are the proximate
cause of, and plaintiff's negligent act :ihich contributed to
it, is a defence. But what amounts to such proximate cause
in _ parent is a question to be d-cided !-y the rule of each
particular jurisdiction. The negligence of the parent is
held'pe-' se in some courts, and so a defence, but in the rm]aj-
ority of the cases the partnt's negligence is a question for
the jury. Others make it a good defencu if the parent -as
present at the injury, and that it must be' a proximate cause,
which is also to be decided by the jury. It is not enough
(a) Chicago ! Alton R. R. Co., v. Gregory, 5 Ill. , 226.
(!n) Phila. c Readi-rw R. R. Co. v. Long, 75 Pa. St., 257.
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that somebody's child vas injured, but there must be negli-
gence on the part of defenu-nt which vas the proximate cause
of the injury. If the parents' negligence was the proximate
cause, then defendant's evidently was not, unless they were
joint wrong~doers.
The California courts lay the error of the Nev York
court, in Hartfield v.'Roper, to the fact"that they ignore
all distinctions between cases where the plaintiff's negli-
gence 1.as the proximate cause and where it was remote", and
in not limiting the rule which they announce,to the foo'mer. (a)
A remote fault in once person, lowever, does not dispense with
care on the part of another, but may in fact make it more nec-
essary to avoid calamitous injury or to mitigate an unavoid-
able calamity. The application ofT the rule as to proximate
cause here is the same as in the case of an adult, but it is
a question vhich varies greatly as to what will be considered
proximate cause in the child or his parent. In other juris-
dictions where negligence is not imputed, the parent's negli-
gence bars his recovery, and then it must be proximate under
a general rule of law.
( a) Meeks v. The S. Pac. R. R. Co., 76 Cal. 513.
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(E) Introduction of the Doctrine of Davies v. Mann. (a)
This doctrine has been cited frequently to dishrove the doc-
trine imputing negligence of parent to the child and makes a
strong negative argument. Under Davies v. Mann, the aefen-
dant is liable for negligence to plaintiff's animal if)by the
use of ordinary care,he might have avoided the injury, after
knowing thit plaintiff had been negligent in leaving it where
it vas. The ruling created a change in the whole law of con-
tributory negligence. In applying it to these cases, it is
argued that an infant of such tender years,as to be incapable
of exercising care , is not less under the protection of the
law th-xn a chattel. "The previous negligence of the parents
is immaterial and the only question for the jury is whether
the defendant, by the use of ordinary care, could have avoid-
ed the injury. If she could notshe is without fault and is
not liable, but if she could she is liable whether plaintiff
was in the street by reason of, or without his parent's negli-
gence. (b) And this is so even as to a trespasser or one
wrongfully on the road or highway. There is as a rule, no, or
a very small, duty due a trespasser; but when the defendant
(a) 10 M. & W. , 545.
(b) ?isaillon v. Blood, 64 N. H. , 565. h.obinson v. Cone, 122
Vt., 213. Jamison v. Ill. Cent. R.". Co., 63 Miss., 3j.
D. & P. R. R. Co. v. O'Connell, 56 Tex., 27. ' alt. City Pus.
Co. v. I'cDonnell, 43 Md., 534..
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discovers him, he is hound not to wantonly injure him, but
must use care to avoid the injury. (a) A person is bound
to use his o ,rn with such reasonable care so cs not to injure
others. This rule hs been so favorably received in the Un-
ited States as regards aaults and property that the wonder is
why it is not oftener applied to the cases of children. Is not
a child entitled to as much care as a drunken man ? I think
'(a) The KAs. Pac. Ry. Co. v. li"i le, 39 Kas. 531.
-'5
C 11A P T E R I I .
I. INFANTS SUIT FOR DAMAGES.
These suits are generally brought by the infant
through his next friend. The action is based almost entirely
upon faet, and the burden is upon the plaintiff to shoi that
h, is not sui juris, and by such evidence as will, when con-
sidered by the jury, merit a verdict. This, t i- court thinks,
is but a fair rule. No fixed rules of liability of defendant
can be .offered as generCl in all the states, because of the
varied opinion among the courts. In some states, where the
parent's negligence is not imputed and the child non sui juris
is incapable of being negligent, it would seem that the plain-
tiff had only to show the status of himself and the negligence
of the defendant, to confirrm his suit. But outside of those
states, it may happen that the child is negligent so as to bar
his action. So in cases wheri parents negligence is not im-
puted, but the child must nevertheless use care according to
his age and capacity, if he doesn't use that care, he must be
negligent. So it must there be shown that such care was
used. In those states where the parent's negligence is im-
puted, there must usually b'_ a concurring act on the part of
thf child which ,-ould be negligence in an adult. If the
child uses proper care, he may recover notwithstanaing the
want of care in tht parent, because that "lould then be too re-
mot . Evidencu to substantiate these must be given in -ach
e
case according to jurisdiction. A dfendant who is guilty of
wanton or willful negligence, if shown, will be liable, not-
withstanding the negligence of the infant or his parent..
- K,-
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II. PARENT'S SUIT FOR DAMAGIS.
Besides the suit for damages by the infant, the par-
ent may also have a cause for loss of Services of the child
and for incidental expenses to the injury such as doctors'
bills, and the like. As a rule he may recover such, but ac-
cording to the rule in most states he cannot recover if he has
been negligent so as to contribute in any way. This applies
the
in states whereAparent's negligence is imputed to the child,
and in states .where it is not, and the child is permitted to
recover. Pennsylvania holds this way, and although no negli-
gence can be imputed to the child and he may recover; yet if
the parent is negligent he cannot recover damages. (a) The
i'ight of the parent to recover when he has been negligent,
they say, would permit him to recover damages for his orn wrong.
(b)
In most all cases the question here is for the Jury to decide,
although some Jurisuictions make ce-tain acts towarcds children
negligence per se The beneficiaries may gFt pecuniary dam-
ages for the death of the child and in a majority of the
cases the negligence of the beneficiary wil not bar his
(a) Erie City Pas. Ry. Co., v. Schuster, 3 Ammerman (Pa), 4.
City of Pekin v. 1Mciahon, 154 Iii. , 141. Cam')erger v. Cit.
St. Ry. Co., 95 Tenn., I". Berry v. Lake Eri-J & W. R. R. Co.
7, Fed. Rep., 679. (b) 7F Yo., F 2. 'Tick v. St. r/, Kas, City
&-N. Ry. Co.. Pitts., Aile. - V. K y: v. Pearson , 2.> Smith, 16'
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recovery as beneficiary because thce action Is for thu child's
>enefit and not the parunts. But an exception *ould be where
the negligent parent iould I e the only beneficiary. Mr.
TGach says: "That a parent can only recover under the same
circumstances of prudence as vould be required if the action
were on behalf of the child. So a parent's action maybe de-
feated by the negligence of the injured child, because where a
plaintiff derives his cause of .ction from an injury done to
a third person, such person is justly chargable with the ne-
gligence of the third person. " (a) %ITo say that the parent
might recover notwithstanding the degree of negligence on the
part of the child, is a statement which has no foundation in
reason, and would be disasterous to commercial life.' (b) The
rule askto parents' actions is little varied in the different
states.
(a) "each on Cont. Neg. , Sc. 132.
(b) Manly v. Th Wilmington (I- Welden R. R. Co., 74 I. C., 6 *5.
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C 0 N C L U S I 0 ,.
Having gone over the numerous findings+f lay' in gen-
eral, it now necessitates a solition of the queries presented
to us and a general summary of what prevails.
The general idea of a child non sui juris as infr-
red from the cases, is such a child as is incapable of caring
for himself in a proper manner. The term is applied, perhaps,
without discretion, but it has become a general term in the
law. To be considered non sui juris, it is not necessary to
be an infant, hut any person who is an idiot or insane may,
upon examination, be found non sui juris. As applicable to
a child, it is only because of the child's inability and want
of judgment and capacity to use p-oper care. The want of such
care gave rise to this doctrine in the law of contributory ne-
gligence. It is generally taken for granted that a small
child cannot use the care of an adult nor can the same rules
of contributory negligence be applied to him, and this , with
perhaps the one excerption, in Ohio, is settled. The doctrine
of Ffartfield v. Roper admitted this when the doctrine of im-
puted negligence was instituted, but there it was considered
immaterial, as the negligent act of the parent was what
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constituted th,,? bar to the infant's action for injury caused
by the negligence of defene.4ant. Even there the child must
have done some act which 1'xuld amount to negligence in an a-
dult. (No adult would go out -nd sit in a traveled road. )
The negligent act of the parent in permitting thE child to get
in such a dangerous position ias a co-existing element. Al-
though the child of itself could do no wrong, it was made ne-
gligent 1)y this fiction of law. Its principles have been de-
nied on all sides and, even in those states where it owed its
creation, it hes been avoided to a certain extent. New York
and Massachusetts now say that it is a question for the jury,
to be decided fror, the circumstances of the case, but still
impute the neglignce. The contrary cases -,,ere inclined to
hold as a matter of law that such small children as to be non
sui juris could not b,. guilty of negligence, nor could they be
charged with it through another. A person incapable of dele-
g-ating his negligence was held incapable of having it imputed
to him to satisfy a fiction.
The doctrine of Davies v. Mann was cited and is now
an effective weapon in destroying the old doctrine. Why
should a child, who is negligently placed in a dangerous posi-
tion, be denied the protection of the law that is afforded
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his parent's horse or other chattel; or when, in the case of
an adult person lying in a state of intoxication in tL- road,
the defendant is bound to use all reasonable care to prevent
any injury to him, not -ith-standing the negligence which cause
him to be there. And in such a case it is not necessary that
th defendant shall see the object, but if h-1 might have seen
it if he had s-een proper care, he is liable. But in the case
of a child, who is incapable of helping himself, he is to be
an object of willful or reckless injury without a redress, sim-
ply because he is not afforded the proper care and protection
due him from those nearest to him.
This, they attempt. to circumvent by claiming him a
trespasser to hom the defendant oved no diligence; and this,
too, in cases which show on their face the infirm support be-
hind them. It is safe to say that the majority of the states
repudiate the doctrine imputing negligence and make defendant's
liability,-a matter for the jury to decide under the ci',cum-
stances. No age can be said to be a time certain under which
the child shall be incapable of all negligence or care, and
after which an ordinary amount of care can be required, al-
though in analogy to th- rule of criminal law that a chila
cannot be guilty of a crime who is under seven years of age,
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some courts have attempted to apply such a rule as to infant's
negligence.. Children of all ages up to seven years have
been held non sui juris and incapable of using care, but it is
not possible to definitely determine just when they become cap-
a 1 e.
A distinction is made between cases wheru the parent
is present at the injury and where he is not. If he is pre-
sent, i' has been 1.,hAd that his negligence vill be imputed, b4t
not if he is absent. This is on the ground of ekercising im-
mediate control of the infant's movements, ancQ the infant is
bound to subject itself to his government and care. Bing en-
titled to ,any benefits resulting from the relation, he is also
liable to Lziy disadvantages arising from it. But sensibly,
I can see no reason why such position of the parent should be
material. His parental authority is not dependant upon immed-
iate presence, but exists as forcibly when at work in his of-
fice as when at home in the presence of his family.
Probably no doctrine has been so warmly received as
the doctrine which takes the par2nt's postion in life into con-
sideration in determining th: negligence of such parent. The
poor have to work for a living and O not have a chance to
keep a close watch over the shildren around them. Such chil-
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dron are liable to escape from them4 at some time, even though
great care is used by the parent to prevent it. Nurses "-re
a luxury not enjoyed by children of poor peoiplLand hetnlthe
children go out to get the much needed air and exercise, it
is 'ith the most available person. This sometimws is a young
person, but such young children are often possessed of unusual
discretion. Their situation in life educateslhem in many
ways that become much older people. The children shoula not
be denied fresh air because there is no one to take them out,
and it should be a question determinable under such circum-
stances. I think that the doctrine i.s admirable in so far as
it is to be applied without discrimination)but a fault may a-
rise in that it will discriminate between classes by being too
rigid. It should be',an elastic rule, applicable to all peo-
ple in thei- particular situation in life. And although
this has not been accepted by any means in a (;eneral way, it
is a rule bound to find favor.
The question, therefore, should be put to the jury
in all cases to determine what is negligence in the parent
and the child. The most general rule and the almost auniver-
sal one is that a child should be required to use the care
which may reasonably be expected fron one of his age and cap-
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acity under the particular circumstances. This is fair. It
says that a small child must only use what may reasonably b-
expect d , and is considerate enough to infer that that is not
much; hut as his age increases, so ,'oes his care. This is so
even in the cases which impute the parent's negligence. If
the child uses such cre, it is not negligent; and if it is
not negligent, and the defendant is, the child may recover
What becomes of the parent's negligence then ? I should
say that it -Vas only remote because the absence of want of
care in the child showqthat all the care under the circumstan-
ces was used and tha-t alone ]vill deny any contributory negli-
gence to defeat the action. But if the parent is net negli-
gent in letting the child get away, 4aa the child escapes not-
withstanding the parent's care, and is injured ? Then, under
the universal rule, I think that it all lies with the plain-
Chat
tiff. If he has used the care ,=fAa child of his age and ca-
pacity vould ordinarily use, the defendant is liahle; but if
he has not used that care, he is guilty of contributory negli-
gence, notwithstanding his age. This, we see, dispels the
idea of putting an age under which a child is non sui juris
in fact ana law. The rule is self operating. If he is young,
the rule is the same, hut it shows that, even then, a small a-

